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JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: 




In the battle for the imagination of the legal community, substantive law has traditionally 
prevailed over procedural law.  For years, the field of civil procedure has struggled to 
overcome the perception that it is either dull (at best) or of secondary importance (at worst).  
Furthermore, longstanding beliefs about the intransigence of parochial national procedures 
have often thwarted attempts to discuss matters of procedure in the international and  
comparative context.   
These assumptions have recently been challenged, however.  For example, scholars 
and practitioners now recognize that “[p]rocedure is an instrument of power that can, in a 
very practical sense, generate or undermine substantive rights”.1  Globalization has inspired 
an increasing number of cross-border transactions and disputes, leading comparativists to 
embrace the notion that “[a]dvocates, advisers, and judges must have at least a working 
knowledge of foreign procedures to be able to frame, anticipate, or decide legal issues that 
cross national boundaries”.2  As a result, comparative civil procedure has become a 
promising new field for both academic and practising lawyers.   
Transnational litigation poses a particular problem for multinational actors in that 
both lawyers and parties typically expect foreign civil procedure to mirror that of their home 
system.  The situation is exacerbated when local counsel fails to recognize how unusual a 
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particular practice may be for non-residents and thus neglects to mention the procedure to the 
client.  The combination of these two factors can lead parties to make major tactical errors 
simply as a result of a procedural misunderstanding.  More information is therefore needed 
about these unusual and often invisible practices so that clients and counsel can make 
strategic decisions in full knowledge of the likely ramifications of their actions.   
One procedure that needs to be more fully understood at the international level is 
jurisdictional discovery, a uniquely American device that combines two of the more 
internationally problematic aspects of United States civil procedure, namely an exceptionally 
broad view of extraterritorial jurisdiction and an expansive approach to pre-trial discovery.  
The mechanism comes into play before the court‟s jurisdiction over the defendant is even 
established and allows plaintiffs to ask defendants
3
 to produce documents and information 
that can be used to justify the plaintiff‟s claim that jurisdiction in this court is proper.  The 





 applies equally to all defendants, regardless of their location.  Though used 
infrequently in the past, jurisdictional discovery against parties based outside the United 
                                                          
3
 Jurisdictional discovery is most commonly ordered against putative defendants, but it can be requested of 
plaintiffs and third parties as well.  This article focuses exclusively on discovery orders directed at named 
defendants, since those cases are more frequent and the issues are somewhat different than those concerning 
non-parties and plaintiffs.  See, eg, Linde v Arab Bank, PLC 262 FRD 136, 145 (EDNY 2009); In re Baycol 
Products Litigation 348 F Supp 2d 1058, 1060 (D Minn 2004). 
4
 See SI Strong, “Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts” (2010) 67 Washington and Lee Law 
Review 489, 492-94 (discussing why research has been limited).  The few existing scholarly works include J 
Anderson, “Toys „R‟ Us, the Third Circuit, and a Standard for Jurisdictional Discovery Involving Internet 
Activities” (2003) 9 Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law 471; KM Clermont, 
“Jurisdictional Fact” (2006) 91 Cornell Law Review 973; Strong, supra; JEC, Note, “Use of Discovery to Obtain 
Jurisdictional Facts” (1973) 59 Virginia Law Review 533.  Internationally oriented analysis by US commentators 
has been limited to cases involving foreign sovereigns.  SR Swanson, “Jurisdictional Discovery Under the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act” (1999) 13 Emory International Law Review 445; JM Terry, Comment, 
“Jurisdictional Discovery Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act” (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law 
Review 1029. 
5
 The device has been scarcely discussed outside the US.  See, eg, RG Blum, “American courts and foreign 
litigants: should American discovery rules apply when a foreigner challenges an American court's jurisdiction?” 
(2000) 11 International Company and Commercial Law Review 114; EP Gay, “Obtaining evidence in England: 
the role of US counsel” (1997) 5 International Insurance Law Review 249. 
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States is on the rise, leading to confusion and conflicts based on differences in the parties‟ 
understanding of proper procedural practice.   
This article therefore has several aims.  First, it attempts to increase awareness of this 
exceptional procedural device so that parties based outside the United States can understand 
the genesis and role of jurisdictional discovery in US federal practice (section B).
6
  Second, 
the article describes what litigants can expect in terms of the practical application of 
jurisdictional discovery (section C).  Third, the article discusses the special means by which 
multinational actors can avoid or limit jurisdictional discovery, based on recent decisions 
from the United States Supreme Court (section D).  Finally, the article concludes with 
remarks on the future of jurisdictional discovery in the transnational context (section E).   
   
B. THE GENESIS AND ROLE OF JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY IN US 
FEDERAL COURTS 
 
Like all procedural mechanisms, jurisdictional discovery arose in response to a specific issue, 
namely the need for every US federal court to confirm that it has jurisdiction over both the 
defendant and the dispute before it makes an adjudication on the merits.
7
  The concept of 
legitimate jurisdiction is nothing new, although every legal system has its own means of 
ascertaining and evaluating facts relevant to a jurisdictional determination.  Interestingly, 
many states demonstrate a heightened concern when they are asked to assert jurisdiction over 
a foreign defendant.  Thus, for example, several common law systems, including England and 
Australia, utilize special service-out proceedings that incorporate various elements that 
benefit foreign defendants.  These pro-defendant components include reversing the normal 
presumption regarding the propriety of the forum, resolving doubts in favour of the foreign 
                                                          
6
 Although jurisdictional discovery also takes place in state courts, the discussion focuses solely on US federal 
law for reasons of space.  
7
 Federal courts in the United States have only limited jurisdiction, meaning that plaintiffs must demonstrate that 
both the dispute and the defendant fall within certain prescribed boundaries.   
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litigant, and requiring claimants to provide full and frank disclosures regarding jurisdictional 
claims, including the provision of information that might be detrimental to the claimant‟s 
jurisdictional assertions.
8
  Canada uses a similar system of service out, although Canadian 
courts demonstrate some scepticism about the merits of a procedure that relies entirely on 
self-disclosure and therefore permit cross-examination of affiants during any hearing on 
jurisdiction.
9
   
The situation is very different in the United States.  For example, US courts do not 
have different procedures for asserting jurisdiction over foreign versus domestic defendants,
10
 
nor does the law impose any presumptions in favour of the non-resident party.  Instead, the 
US system permits plaintiffs to name whomever they wish as defendants, without any judicial 
oversight and subject only to the plaintiffs‟ good faith belief that jurisdiction is proper.11  
Furthermore, plaintiffs need not even hold any firm evidence that jurisdiction is warranted 
when they file their claim.  Instead, they can wait for the defendant to challenge jurisdiction 
and then ask the judge for an order of jurisdictional discovery that compels the defendant to 
produce documents and information regarding relevant jurisdictional facts, including facts 
adverse to the defendant‟s position.   
This type of approach demonstrates both a high level of distrust regarding the 
possibility of self-serving disclosures on the part of defendants as well as a bias towards 
broad access to justice.  US courts have expressed concern that other procedures (such as 
those used in service out) could force courts to dismiss otherwise legitimate claims simply as 
                                                          
8
 See, eg, Civil Procedure Rules (England) [hereinafter CPR] Rs 6.33, 6.36-6.37; Practice Direction 6b, Service 
out of the Jurisdiction (England); Federal Court Rules (Australia) Order 8, Rs 2-3; The Hagen [1908] P 189 
(England); C Joseph & PS Selvin, “Service of Process Under United States and English Law”, in J Fellas (ed), 
Transatlantic Commercial Litigation and Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2004) 37, 56, 72. 
9
 See OG Chase et al (eds), Civil Litigation in Comparative Context  (St Paul, Thomson West, 2007) 522-23. 
10
 The US uses a slightly different method of service for foreign and domestic defendants, but jurisdiction and 
service are not linked to the same extent as they are in England, for example.  See Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (US) [hereinafter Fed R Civ P] R 4; Sir Lawrence Collins et al (eds), Dicey, Morris and Collins on 
The Conflict of Laws para 11-003 (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 14
th
 edn, 2006). 
11
 See Fed R Civ P 11(b).  
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a result of the defendant‟s withholding information about jurisdictionally relevant facts.12  
The problem is that this method of establishing jurisdiction appears to be utterly unique, even 
within the common law tradition.  Indeed, Australia‟s highest court recently refused a request 
for jurisdictional discovery in the context of a service-out proceeding, claiming that the 
interests of international comity meant that “a foreign defendant served outside Australia 
should not lightly be subjected to the jurisdiction of this Court, but more importantly should 
not have imposed upon him one of the Court‟s compulsory processes in aid of establishing 
the jurisdiction itself”.13 
As exceptional as jurisdictional discovery may be, it makes sense when viewed in its 
historic and domestic context.  Interestingly, jurisdictional discovery is not mentioned in any 
statute or rule of court.  Instead, it is an entirely judge-made procedure that is rooted in the 
policies and procedures reflected in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were 
considered ground-breaking at the time of their adoption in 1938.  Indeed, jurisdictional 
discovery did not exist in the United States prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules.
14
   
The first reported decision to use the phrase “jurisdictional discovery” was handed 
down in 1961 and involved two defendants – one British, one Bermudan – who were 
allegedly subject to the jurisdiction of the US court either by virtue of “doing business” in the 
forum or as the alter egos of defendants who were indisputably subject to the court‟s 
control.
15
  When the defendants sought to have the case dismissed, the court held that it had 
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, and the fact that the defendants had not yet been 
properly determined to be “parties” did not allow them to avoid discovery procedures that 
were analogous to procedures concerning discovery on the merits.  Notably, this second 
                                                          
12
 See Mother Doe I v Al Maktoum 632 F Supp 2d 1130, 1144 (SD Fla 2007). 
13
 Armacel Pty Ltd v Smurfit Stone Container Corp [2007] FCA 1928 para 8.    
14
 See, eg, Strong, supra n 4, 497-98; JEC, supra n 4, 545. 
15
 General Industrial Co v Birmingham Sound Reproducers, Ltd 26 FRD 559, 561 (EDNY 1961).   
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Jurisdictional discovery was used sparingly in subsequent years, but the device gained 
credibility in 1978 by virtue of the United States Supreme Court‟s opinion in Oppenheimer 
Fund, Inc v Sanders.
17
  There, the Supreme Court cited the seminal decision of Hickman v 
Taylor
18
 for the proposition that relevance in discovery is and should be construed broadly, 
stating that: 
[c]onsistently with the notice-pleading system established by the [Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure], discovery is not limited to issues raised by the 
pleadings, for discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues.  
Nor is discovery limited to the merits of a case, for a variety of fact-oriented 
issues may arise during litigation that are not related to the merits.
19
   
 
Thus, “where issues arise as to jurisdiction or venue, discovery is available to ascertain the 
facts bearing on such issues”.20  Subsequent federal cases have all affirmed the principle of 
jurisdictional discovery, and today it is universally accepted that “a federal district court has 
the power to require a defendant to respond to discovery requests relevant to his or her 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction”.21   
Jurisdictional discovery is therefore built on three interrelated concepts.  First is the 
idea that courts retain the power to determine their own jurisdiction.  This tenet is 
unremarkable and is reflected in other jurisdictions, including England.
22
  Second is the 
notion of notice pleading, which is somewhat unusual in the world of civil procedure.
23
  
                                                          
16
 See Armacel Pty Ltd v Smurfit Stone Container Corp [2007] FCA 1928 para 8. 
17
 437 US 340 (1978). 
18
 329 US 495, 500-01 (1947). 
19




 Ellis v Fortune Seas, Ltd 175 FRD 308, 311 (SD Ind 1997). 
22
 See A Briggs & P Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (London, Informa, 5
th
 edn, 2005) 403-04. 
23
 Fact pleading is said to be more common, though some states‟ interpretation of fact pleading is somewhat lax 
and perhaps more akin to US notice pleading.  See, eg, CPR Rs 16.2, 16.4; ALI/UNIDROIT, Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure (Cambridge University Press, 2006) xlviii-xlix; N Andrews, The Modern Civil 
Process (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2008) paras 3.04 (describing English “statements of case”( ie, pleadings) and 
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However, it has been said that pleadings in US cases contain “sufficiently detailed 
information that a requirement of „fact pleading‟ can, in fact, be fulfilled”, which suggests 
that in practice the US approach is not as different from other jurisdictions as is commonly 
believed.
24
  Third is the conclusion, apparently unique to the United States, that first two 
principles, taken together, must necessarily trigger application of discovery regarding the 
jurisdictional facts in dispute.   
 
C. JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY IN PRACTICE 
1. Practical Procedures 
Having outlined the genesis and jurisprudential basis for jurisdictional discovery, it is time to 
discuss the device‟s practical application.  Jurisdictional discovery arises at the beginning of a 
lawsuit, very soon after process has been served.  A defendant who questions the jurisdiction 
of the US court typically responds to service of process in one of three ways:
25
   
First, [a defendant] may ignore the complaint and summons and then, if a 
default judgment is issued against her, may challenge the issuing court‟s 
jurisdiction in a collateral proceeding (presumably closer to home or other 
assets) when the plaintiff seeks to enforce the judgment.  Second, she may 
voluntarily waive any lack of personal jurisdiction and submit to the distant 
court‟s jurisdiction.  Third, she may appear in the distant court to assert the 
lack of personal jurisdiction.  By taking this third route, . . . the defendant 
submits herself to the jurisdiction and power of the court for the limited 
purpose of deciding the jurisdictional issue.  That court‟s decision in the 
jurisdictional issue will be res judicata in future proceedings to enforce a 
judgment.  On this third route, the defendant also submits to the procedures of 





Thus, jurisdictional discovery is typically triggered by the defendant‟s entering a 
formal objection to the court‟s jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
noting “[t]here is no need to include . . . any detailed evidence or details of legal argument” in such statements), 
3.08.   
24
 ALI/UNIDROIT, supra n 23, xlix; see also ibid, 7; Dodson, supra n 2, 443, 452. 
25
 Recent US Supreme Court decisions have suggested other tactical alternatives in a limited number of cases.  
See infra notes 104-27 and accompanying text. 
26





  At that point, “the trial court has three procedural alternatives:  „it may decide 
the motion upon the affidavits alone; it may permit discovery in aid of deciding the motion; 
or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve any apparent factual questions.‟”28  If 
jurisdictional discovery is ordered, the party against whom the order is made must comply in 
full.  Failure to do so can lead to sanctions ranging from the court‟s shifting the burden to the 
defendant to prove that jurisdiction does not exist to deeming certain matters to have been 
conceded.
29
  Courts can even go so far as to conclude that jurisdiction does, in fact, exist, so 
long as doing so is “fair” and “just” in the circumstances.30  However, defendants do not 
simply have to endure burdensome or oppressive discovery orders; should compliance 
become unduly difficult, expensive, embarrassing or annoying, a party can seek a protective 
order pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although the definition 
of burdensomeness is of course viewed from the US legal perspective, which may not be as 
favourable as a foreign litigant would like.  
 
2. Legal Standards  
Once jurisdictional discovery has been requested, the court must consider two related 
questions:  (1) whether jurisdictional discovery ought to be ordered and (2) what the scope of 
such discovery is to be, if such an order is made.  These issues are covered separately below.   
 
(a) Availability of jurisdictional discovery  
United States federal courts agree that that “[t]he party seeking [jurisdictional] discovery 
bears the burden of showing its necessity” as well as the ultimate burden of demonstrating 
                                                          
27
 A federal district court may also raise questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, although 
such a move would be unusual.  See Grupo Dataflux v Atlas Global Group, LP 541 US 567, 593 (2004). 
28
 Hagen v U-Haul of Tennessee 613 F Supp 2d 986, 1002 n10 (WD Tenn 2009) (citation omitted). 
29
 See Fed R Civ P 37; Saudi v Marine Atlantic, Ltd 306 Fed Appx 653, 654 (2d Cir 2009). 
30
 Insurance Corp of Ireland, Ltd v Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee 456 US 694, 709 (1982).   
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that the jurisdiction of the court is proper.
31
  Beyond that, little is consistent in this area of 
law.  For example, there is no national consensus regarding the circumstances in which 
jurisdictional discovery will be granted,
32
 despite the claim that matters of procedure are 
supposed to be uniform across the nation.
33
  To some extent, the disparity arises because 
matters of discovery reside firmly within the discretion of trial court judges, but the 
disinclination of the US Supreme Court to provide guidance at the national level has proven 
problematic as well.
34
   
Although standards vary widely regarding the availability of jurisdictional discovery, 
many courts focus on whether a prima facie showing of jurisdiction has been made.
35
  
However, a number of jurisdictions do not even require that minimal showing to be met.
36
  
For example, some courts simply look for “a colorable claim of jurisdiction”,37 while other 
courts have stated that so long as the plaintiff‟s claims regarding personal jurisdiction are not 
“clearly frivolous”, the judge “should ordinarily allow discovery on jurisdiction in order to 
aid the plaintiff” in discharging its burden of proof in establishing jurisdiction.38  Even more 
lenient are courts that state that “[d]iscovery may be appropriately granted [even] where 
                                                          
31
 Maersk, Inc v Neewra, Inc 554 F Supp 2d 424, 440 (SDNY 2008); see also Freeman v United States 556 F 3d 
326 (5
th
 Cir 2009); CA Wright & AR Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (St Paul, Thomson West, 3d edn, 
2010) s 1067.6. 
32
 See, eg, Klein v Freedom Strategic Partners, LL, 595 F Supp 2d 1152, 1160 (D Nev 2009); Mother Doe I v Al 
Maktoum 632 F Supp 2d 1130, 1144-45 (SD Fla 2007); Ellis v Fortune Seas, Ltd 175 FRD 308, 312 (SD Ind 
1997). 
33
 Fed R Civ P 26, cmt 2000 amend. 
34
 Review of issues involving jurisdictional discovery has been sought, but denied, on two separate occasions in 
the last five years.  See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lowery v Alabama Power Co, 483 F 3d 1994 (11
th
 Cir 
2007), cert denied sub nom Hanna Steel Corp v Lowery 128 S Ct 2877 (2008); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 
Dever v Hentzen Coatings, Inc 380 F 3d 1070 (8
th
 Cir 2004), cert denied, 543 US 1147 (2005).   
35
 See Strong, supra n 4, 524-32 (discussing various standards). 
36
 See GTE New Media Services, Inc v BellSouth Corp 199 F 3d 1343, 1352 (DC Cir 2000); Mother Doe I v Al 
Maktoum 632 F Supp 2d 1130, 1144-45 (SD Fla 2007); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation 94 F Supp 2d 26, 35 
(DDC 2000). 
37
 Hollins v US Tennis Association 469 F Supp 2d 67, 70 (EDNY 2006).   
38
 Regan v Loewenstein 292 Fed Appx 200, 205 (3d Cir 2008); see also Metcalfe v Renaissance Marine, Inc 566 
F 3d 324, 330, 336 (3d Cir 2009). 
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pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted”.39  These standards 
are very liberal, and indeed many courts speak of a “qualified right” to jurisdictional 
discovery.
40
   
The availability of jurisdictional discovery may vary somewhat according to the 
relationship between the parties.  For example, “where the facts necessary to establish 
personal jurisdiction . . . lie exclusively within the defendant‟s knowledge”, discovery will 
typically be permitted.
41
  Jurisdictional discovery may thus be “particularly appropriate where 
the defendant is a corporation”, since the plaintiff – as a “total stranger” to the defendant – 
“should not be required . . . to try such an issue [ie, jurisdiction] on affidavits without the 
benefit of full discovery”.42  However, “[i]n cases based on alleged contracts between the 
parties, it would be an unusual case where the plaintiff should need discovery to show 
specific jurisdiction linking the defendant and the controversy to the forum”, since the 
plaintiff should already be in possession of the necessary facts.
43
   
Regardless of their precise formulations, all of these standards are very plaintiff-
friendly, and at first blush it would seem unlikely that a request for jurisdictional discovery 
would ever be denied.  However, “a court cannot permit discovery as a matter of course 
simply because a plaintiff has named a particular party as a defendant”.44  Thus, a request for 
discovery that is “based on little more than a hunch that it might yield jurisdictionally 
relevant facts” may be properly denied,45 since jurisdictional discovery “is intended to 
                                                          
39
 Boschetto v Hansing 539 F 3d 1011, 1011 (9
th
 Cir 2008); see also Blair v City of Worcester 522 F 3d 105, 111 
(1st Cir 2008) (supporting discovery in cases of “plausible factual disagreement or ambiguity”); Klein v 
Freedom Strategic Partners, LLC 595 F Supp 2d 1152, 1160 (D Nev 2009). 
40
 Eaton v Dorchester Dev, Inc 692 F 2d 727, 729 n7 (11
th
 Cir 1982); Williamson v Tucker 645 F 2d 404, 414 
(5
th
 Cir 1981); Blanco v Carigulf Lines 632 F 2d 656 (5
th
 Cir 1980); Chatham Condominium Associations v 
Century Village, Inc 597 F 2d 1002, 1012 (5
th
 Cir 1979); Mother Doe I v Al Maktoum 632 F Supp 2d 1130, 1145 
(SD Fla 2007). 
41
 Hollins v US Tennis Association 469 F Supp 2d 67, 71 (EDNY 2006).   
42
 Metcalfe v Renaissance Marine, Inc 566 F 3d 324, 330, 336 (3d Cir 2009). 
43
 Ellis v Fortune Seas, Ltd 175 FRD 308, 312 (SD Ind 1997).  
44
 Hansen v Neumueller 163 FRD 471, 475 (D Del 1995). 
45
 Boschetto v Hansing 539 F 3d 1011, 1020 (9
th
 Cir 2008). 
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supplement, not substitute for, initial jurisdictional allegations”.46  Similarly, a claim of 
jurisdiction that appears to be both “attenuated and based on bare allegations in the face of 
specific denials made by defendants” will not suffice to support an order of jurisdictional 
discovery, at least where there has been no showing that further discovery would assist in 
demonstrating that jurisdiction existed.
47
  Nevertheless, the general rule appears to be that 
jurisdictional discovery will be ordered in all but the most extreme cases, and defendants 
should assume that such discovery is far more likely to be ordered than not. 
 
(b) Scope of jurisdictional discovery  
Once jurisdictional discovery has been ordered, courts still must decide its scope, ostensibly 
“tak[ing] care to ensure that litigation of the jurisdictional issue does not undermine the 
purposes of personal jurisdiction law in the first place”.48  It is often said that jurisdictional 
discovery is to be “narrowly tailored” and “limited” to jurisdictional issues49 and that 
discovery requests must be shaped so as to be likely to produce information relevant to the 
jurisdictional inquiry.
50
   
 Straightforward as these guidelines may seem in theory, in fact they do very little to 
constrain what turns out to be relatively broad discovery orders.  The reason why 
jurisdictional discovery cannot be easily contained relates to the law regarding federal 
jurisdiction, which has become increasingly complex and fact-intensive over the last thirty 
years, both with respect to jurisdiction over the person and jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the dispute.  Because neither the parties nor the courts know in advance precisely 
what combination of facts will tip the balance in one direction or the other, plaintiffs often 
                                                          
46
 Doe I v State of Israel 400 F Supp 2d 86, 121-22 (DDC 2005). 
47
 Autogenomics, Inc v Oxford Gene Technology Ltd 566 F 3d 1020, 1023 (Fed Cir 2009). 
48
 Ellis v Fortune Seas, Ltd 175 FRD 308, 312 (SD Ind 1997). 
49
 See, eg, Toys “R” Us, Inc. v Step Two, SA 318 F 3d 446, 448 (3d Cir 2006); Nationwide Mutual Ins Society v 
Tryg Int’l Ins Co 91 F 3d 790, 792 (6th Cir 1996).   
50
 See, eg, Freeman v United States 556 F 3d 326, 342 (5
th
 Cir 2009).   
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seek production of a great deal of information so as to ensure themselves of a favourable 
outcome.   
Interestingly, these kinds of broad requests for production of documents and 
information were not the norm when jurisdictional discovery was first developed during the 
1960s and 1970s.  Instead, jurisdictional discovery quite probably was a narrow, limited 
inquiry into a few relevant facts.  However, two key developments irrevocably altered the 
scope of the device.  First, the types of disputes that appeared in federal court changed 
radically between 1938 and the late twentieth century, moving from small, local matters to 
large, complicated, inter-state or international disputes that involved more controversial 
jurisdictional claims.
51
   Second, most of the key judicial opinions regarding federal 
jurisdiction arose after the 1978 decision in Oppenheimer that legitimized jurisdictional 
discovery as a procedural device in US federal courts.
52
  Because the Supreme Court has not 
yet dealt with the question of what constitutes “limited” jurisdictional discovery in the 
contemporary context, lower federal courts have been left to fend for themselves in deciding 
how best to meld the pro-plaintiff, pro-discovery presumptions embodied in the law 
concerning jurisdictional discovery with increasingly expansive definitions of jurisdictionally 
relevant facts.  District court judges have therefore not been given any theoretical principles 
that would allow a more restrictive approach and have thus tended to allow discovery of any 
information that might possibly be relevant to the question of jurisdiction.  As a result, 
jurisdictional discovery has become extremely wide-ranging, despite the claim that the device 
is – or should be – limited in scope.   
For many people, the primary problem with jurisdictional discovery relates to the 
time, cost and effort involved in producing large amounts of documents and information 
                                                          
51
 Strong, supra n 4, 504. 
52
 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc v Sanders 437 US 340, 351 n13 (1978).  Only one major case on federal jurisdiction 
predates Oppenheimer.  See International Shoe Co v Washington 326 US 310 (1945) (creating the minimum 
contacts test for personal jurisdiction).   
13 
 
before the jurisdiction of the court is even established.
53
  Although that is indeed disturbing, 
the device can also lead to other concerns.  Issues arise with respect to inquiries regarding 
both personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction, as discussed below.   
 
Personal jurisdiction 
Personal jurisdiction in US federal courts depends on two types of authority, one legislative 
and one constitutional.  Both must be present for a federal court to assert jurisdiction over a 
defendant‟s person or property.   
Legislative authority can take one of three forms.  First, federal courts can rely on a 
long-arm statute
54
 enacted by the state in which the court sits and “adopt” it into use through 
Rule 4(k)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Second, courts can, pursuant to 
Rule 4(k)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, invoke any jurisdictional grants 
contained in any substantive federal law on which the plaintiff relies.  Third, courts faced 
with defendants from outside the United States can look to Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which creates a type of federal long-arm statute in certain federal question 
cases.  All three types of jurisdiction are relied upon regularly in practice. 
Perhaps the most striking problem with jurisdictional discovery in the context of 
federal courts‟ legislative authority involves state long-arm statutes, particularly those that 
enumerate the specific activities that permit personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  In some 
                                                          
53
 Space limitations prohibit the reproduction of actual requests for jurisdictional discovery, but the amount of 
information sought can be extensive.  See Strong, supra n 4, 535-57 (containing actual discovery requests filed 
in US federal court). 
54
 State long-arm statutes describe the jurisdictional reach of a particular state court and typically adopt one of 
two approaches:  (1) an expansive view that permits jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the US 
Constitution (or sometimes both the US Constitution and the state constitution) or (2) a narrower view that lists 
the specific circumstances in which personal jurisdiction may be asserted.  See, eg, California Civil Procedure 
Code s 410.10 (2006) (extending jurisdiction to the full extent of state and federal constitutional limits); New 
York Civil Practice Law s 302 (2006) (using the enumerated grounds approach); Utah Code Annotated s 78B-3-
201 (2008) (extending jurisdiction to the full extent of the federal constitution).    
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instances, these statutes require federal courts to undertake complex, fact-specific 
jurisdictional analyses that mimic the type of inquiries that must be made on the merits.
55
 
For example, some state long-arm statutes assert jurisdiction over defendants based on 
principles of agency or corporate law.  Thus, jurisdictional discovery might be sought in a US 
federal court regarding the existence or scope of an agency relationship or regarding the 
extent to which an affiliate acted as the alter ego of another corporate entity.
56
  However, 
these issues are not only quite broad, giving rise to extensive (and expensive) discovery, they 
also go to the defendant‟s liability on the merits.57  As such, the defendant is burdened by 
having to consider merits-based arguments even in advance of any determination on 
jurisdiction.  Furthermore, the plaintiff receives the benefit of early discovery of the 
defendant‟s documents and information at a stage when the defendant is not in a position to 
request similar discovery in return, lest such requests negate the jurisdictional objection.  
Another problematic type of federal jurisdiction based on legislative authority 
involves allegations of a conspiracy involving the defendant.  “Conspiracy jurisdiction” – 
which can be based on state long-arm statutes made applicable in federal court through Rule 
4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or on a jurisdiction-granting federal statute such as 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
58
 – is in some ways even 
more troubling than jurisdiction based on agency or corporate law, since the ties between the 
parties and the forum are even more attenuated and nuanced than in cases involving corporate 
or agency relationships (and thus more difficult to establish through limited discovery).
59
  
                                                          
55
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Hollins v US Tennis Association 469 F Supp 2d 67, 72 (EDNY 2006).  Courts may also need to undertake 
15 
 
Furthermore, conspiracy jurisdiction reflects the same problems as jurisdiction based on 
theories involving agency or corporate liability, in that it involves early disclosure of 
numerous facts that are intimately associated with liability on the merits.
60
  Conspiracy 
jurisdiction also gives rise to various jurisprudential issues that are beyond the scope of this 




Difficulties with federal grants of jurisdiction can also arise when foreign sovereigns 
claim immunity from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
62
  As a 
federal statute containing legislative authority to grant jurisdiction in US federal courts, the 
FSIA is somewhat unique, in that it links “subject matter and personal jurisdictional questions 
. . . with immunity questions” and grants foreign states and instrumentalities immunity from 
suit unless one of several exceptions apply.
63
  The problem is that the information that denies 
the court jurisdiction is typically the same that grants substantive immunity.  Thus, FSIA 
cases – like agency, alter ego and conspiracy cases – result in jurisdictional discovery that 
overlaps with merits discovery.  Cases arising under the FSIA also experience problems 
because of the “tension between permitting discovery to substantiate exceptions to statutory 
foreign sovereign immunity and protecting a sovereign‟s or sovereign agency‟s legitimate 
claim to immunity from discovery”.64  Courts have only “rarely explain[ed] how to conduct 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
jurisdictional discovery regarding subject matter jurisdiction under RICO.  Wiwa v Shell Petroleum Dev Co. of 
Nigeria Ltd 335 Fed Appx 81, 84 (2d Cir 2009).  
60
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or manage limited discovery to determine jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns” and have 
instead resorted to the simple platitude that discovery should be “narrow” or “limited”.65   
All of these examples reflect situations where jurisdictional discovery will likely be 
considered highly appropriate, since the relevant facts are typically in the exclusive control of 
the defendant.  Furthermore, these examples demonstrate how challenging it can be for courts 
to craft a narrow discovery order concerning jurisdiction, particularly when jurisdictional and 
merits issues overlap.  In some cases, courts have given up on the task altogether and have 
instead permitted plaintiffs to address jurisdictional issues as part of discovery on the merits 
rather than try to issue a suitably limited jurisdictional discovery order.
66
  This, of course, has 
the effect of putting the defendant through the burden of broad discovery before the question 
of jurisdiction is even settled, an approach that violates “the very right the jurisdictional basis 
requirements are designed to protect:  the right not to have to litigate that case in that 
forum”.67 
 The problems do not end there, however.  Legislative authority for federal jurisdiction 
over the person is only one part of the analysis.  Federal courts must also undertake a 
constitutional inquiry into the propriety of exercising jurisdiction over the defendant.
68
  The 
central inquiry here is one of fairness, which “recognizes both the practical expenses and 
burdens of subjecting a party to a lawsuit in a distant court”.69  Although the fundamental test 
regarding the constitutional limits of US federal courts was enunciated in 1945 in 
International Shoe v Washington (ie, the “minimum contacts” test),70 no one thought at the 
time to consider the decision‟s impact on jurisdictional discovery, quite possibly for the 
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simple reason that at that time jurisdictional discovery had not even begun to develop.  
Furthermore, when jurisdictional discovery began to achieve some legitimacy in the late 
1970s,
71
 courts and commentators failed to consider how a purposefully vague and highly 
fact-specific constitutional analysis
72
 would affect jurisdictional discovery.  Although that 
was, in retrospect, a bit of an oversight, it is also true that the more complex constitutional 
tests for jurisdiction had not yet been developed; that would not happen until the 1980s, with 
a string of cases beginning with World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson.
73
  
These cases have made the constitutional test for jurisdiction increasingly complicated 
and difficult to apply.  Some attempts at clarification have been made, primarily through the 
differentiation between general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction, where “general 
jurisdiction” looks at whether the defendant has established some sort of “presence” in the 
forum through “continuous and systematic” business activity within the relevant territory and 
“specific jurisdiction” looks at claims that “arise out of” or “relate to” a defendant‟s activity 
in that forum,
74
 but the ability to argue both jurisdictional grounds in the alternative means 
that defendants often need to produce information regarding both types of jurisdiction.
75
    
As a result, the current constitutional analysis regarding the propriety of federal 
jurisdiction involves a multi-factor, fact-specific inquiry that provides little or no guidance as 
to what information is determinative or even most persuasive.
76
  Because the United States 
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Supreme Court has indicated that “even a single act can support jurisdiction”, many district 
courts are loath to limit jurisdictional discovery on constitutional issues.
77
  Furthermore, even 
if the parameters of the minimum contacts test itself could be discerned and narrowed, the 
analysis – and the realm of discoverable facts – would nevertheless be subsequently 
expanded by the need for courts to determine that the exercise of jurisdiction is “reasonable” 
through the use of various “gestalt factors”.78   
Thus, the constitutional tests regarding the outer limits of US federal courts‟ 
jurisdiction has become a leading cause for jurisdictional discovery that extends far beyond 
any sort of limited inquiry that might have initially been contemplated by those who first 
developed the device in the 1960s and 1970s.  Furthermore, the courts‟ constitutional 
inquiries are not limited to the realm of personal jurisdiction alone.  Cases that proceed in 
rem and quasi-in rem may need to undertake the same kind of constitutional analyses before 




Subject matter jurisdiction 
Parties proceeding in US federal courts must do more than establish jurisdiction over the 
defendant.  They must also demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of a dispute by showing that the claim arises under either US federal or constitutional law.
80
   
One of the most common types of federal disputes involves “diversity jurisdiction”, 
which requires both (1) diversity of citizenship (such as that between a citizen of a US state 
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and a foreign party) and (2) more than $75,000 in dispute.
81
  Diversity cases can give rise to 
several types of jurisdictional discovery.  For example, information may be sought to confirm 
that the jurisdictional minimum exists.
82
  Although some calculations (such as those 
involving the computation of lost wages in a claim for wrongful termination) are merely 
mathematical and would not require jurisdictional discovery, others involve more complex 
issues of fact.  For example, a plaintiff might seek discovery to demonstrate that the 
defendant engaged in “„malicious, willful or outrageous‟ conduct” that would support an 
award of treble damages, since those damages could be used to help meet the jurisdictional 
minimum.
83
  Unfortunately, this creates the same sorts of problems that were discussed 
earlier with respect to personal jurisdiction arising under certain state long-arm statutes, 
where jurisdictional discovery mirrored merits-based discovery.
84
   
Discovery can also be sought regarding other aspects of diversity jurisdiction.  For 
example, courts may need to determine whether a corporate or other juridical person is a 
“citizen” of a particular state or nation.85  The current test for corporate citizenship states that 
a corporation will be deemed to be a citizen of the place where it has its “nerve center”, 
meaning “the actual center of direction, control, and coordination”.86  Although there may be 
times when locating a corporation‟s “nerve center” is relatively simple, the Supreme Court 
has recently recognized that there will also be hard cases that require jurisdictional 
discovery.
87
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Finally, jurisdictional discovery may be sought regarding aspects of federal subject 
matter outside the diversity context.  For example, discovery may be requested to determine 
whether a claim falls under a particular federal statute.
88
  Again, this type of discovery may 
not only be burdensome, it may also mirror the kind of discovery that is required on the 
merits. 
 
(c) International issues  
As indicated previously, United States is unlike other common law jurisdictions in that it 
does not invoke special procedures (such as service out) to assert jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants.  On one level, therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that US federal courts order 
jurisdictional discovery equally against all defendants, regardless of the location of the party 
against whom the order is directed.
89
  Indeed, this is consistent with the general tendency of 
US courts to rely on domestic law and policy to decide legal issues rather than looking to 
international or comparative legal principles.
90
  On another level, however, it appears 
somewhat incongruous for US federal courts to order jurisdictional discovery against foreign 
parties in the same manner as they do against domestic parties, given that the United States is 
a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or 
Commercial Matters (Hague Convention).
91
   
 The Hague Convention aims “to improve mutual judicial cooperation in civil or 
commercial matters” by providing “methods to reconcile the differing legal philosophies” of 
various nations and establishing means of obtaining evidence that “satisfy doctrines of legal 
                                                          
88
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sovereignty”.92  Unsurprisingly, the procedures set forth by the Hague Convention differ 
significantly from those used by US federal courts pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, providing a more certain but more restrictive means of obtaining evidence located 
abroad.  In the years immediately following the United States‟ accession to the Hague 
Convention, many US litigants took the view that they should be able to invoke the more 
liberal mechanisms outlined in the Federal Rules, regardless of the provisions outlined in the 
Hague Convention.  Some but not all US courts accepted that approach, and a conflict arose 
in the lower federal courts regarding the applicability and scope of the Hague Convention.  In 
1987, the United States Supreme Court agreed to consider the use of the Hague Convention 
in cases involving merits discovery (but not jurisdictional discovery) in Société Nationale 
Industrielle Aérospatiale v United States District Court.
93
   
After considering several possible interpretations of the Hague Convention and the 
ramifications that would ensue from each of them, the Supreme Court held that the 
Convention is nothing more than an optional or “permissive supplement, not a pre-emptive 
replacement, for other means of obtaining evidence located abroad”.94  In other words, 
although procedures under the Hague Convention “are available whenever they will facilitate 
the gathering of evidence by the means authorized in the Convention”, they are only “one 
method of seeking evidence that a court may elect to employ”.95  Furthermore, there is no 
rule that “would require first resort to Convention procedures whenever discovery is sought 
from a foreign litigant”.96  Thus, US courts may rely solely on the procedures outlined in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even when discovery is sought of a litigant located abroad.   
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The US approach did not meet with international approval:  much to the contrary.  
Indeed, a Special Commission of the Hague Conference concluded shortly after the decision 
in Aérospatiale that while views may vary internationally as to whether the Hague 
Convention “occupie[s] the field and therefore exclude[s] application of domestic procedural 
rules” (ie, whether the Convention is the only possible means by which evidence may be 
sought transnationally), “the Commission thought that in all Contracting States, whatever 
their views as to its exclusive application, priority should be given to the procedures offered 
by the Convention when evidence located abroad is being sought”.97  Notably, the United 
States has not altered its approach, despite the Special Commission‟s report.  
Although the applicability and scope of the Hague Convention has been severely 
curtailed in the United States as a result of Aérospatiale, the Convention still plays a role in 
US transnational litigation, primarily in cases involving discovery of non-litigants who are 
not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the court.  In those instances, use of the Hague 
Convention is typically required.
98
  Given this line of precedent, one might think that 
recourse to the Hague Convention would or should be required for jurisdictional discovery, 
since that process takes place before the court has determined that jurisdiction over the 
defendant is proper.  As such, these putative defendants could be viewed as more akin to non-
litigants than to parties to the litigation.  That, however, is not the case.  Instead, federal 
courts have consistently followed Aérospatiale, concluding that the Hague Convention is 
merely permissive in cases involving jurisdictional discovery orders directed towards named 
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  Furthermore, although parties have argued “that a rule of first-
resort [to the Hague Convention] is more important for jurisdictional discovery than for 
merits discovery because the comity interests of the foreign nations are higher before 
defendants are conclusively found to be subject to the Court‟s jurisdiction”, most US courts 
have not adopted that view.
100
  Instead, Aérospatiale applies in full force to questions of 
jurisdictional discovery, and parties based outside of the United States can expect 
jurisdictional discovery orders to be issued under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
precisely the same way as in purely domestic cases, applying the same procedures, the same 
standards as to availability and the same determinations as to scope.
101
 
 As frustrating as Aérospatiale may be to foreign parties, the practical effect of the 
decision is diminished as a result of article 23 of the Hague Convention.  That provision 
allows state signatories to indicate that they will not comply with Convention procedures in 
cases involving pre-trial discovery.  The vast majority of state signatories have made a 
reservation under article 23, which has the effect of foreclosing numerous US discovery 
attempts – including jurisdictional discovery requests – that would be unobjectionable under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
102
  Thus, even if the United States applied the rule of 
first resort that was proposed by the Special Commission of the Hague Conference, foreign 
litigants would still be subject to jurisdictional discovery orders under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure as a secondary measure.  The only way a different result would ensue is if the 
United States adopted the view that the Hague Convention constituted the sole and exclusive 
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means of obtaining evidence from a foreign litigant.  Notably, that approach has not won 
worldwide adherence and is unlikely to be adopted by the United States.   
 Therefore, foreign parties who oppose jurisdictional discovery will likely obtain little 
relief by challenging Aérospatiale.  Instead, they would do better to attack jurisdictional 
discovery under principles of domestic law
103
 – something that has, interestingly, become 
more of an option due to several recent decisions from the United States Supreme Court.  
 
D. FOREIGN PARTIES‟ ABILITY TO LIMIT OR AVOID JURISDICTIONAL 
DISCOVERY  
 
In the past, parties on the receiving end of an order for jurisdictional discovery have had very 
few tactical alternatives available to them.
104
  However, recent US Supreme Court precedent 
may offer some relief to foreign parties named as defendants in US federal court.  Two 
possible solutions exist.  The first is more of a stop-gap measure, providing only intermittent 
assistance on a case-by-case basis, whereas the second may provide a long-term answer to the 
problem of jurisdictional discovery of foreign litigants. 
 The first solution arises out of Sinochem International Co v Malaysia International 
Shipping Corp, which considered whether federal courts that are faced with several different 
motions to dismiss have to decide those motions in any particular order.
105
  In particular, the 
issue was whether courts first have to establish that they have both personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction over a party before they can dismiss the case as a matter of discretion 
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
106
  In that case, the Supreme Court held that: 
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[i]f . . . a court can readily determine that it lacks jurisdiction over the cause or 
the defendant, the proper course would be to dismiss on that ground. In the 
mine run of cases, jurisdiction “will involve no arduous inquiry” and both 
judicial economy and the consideration ordinarily accorded the plaintiff‟s 
choice of forum “should impel the federal court to dispose of [those] issue[s] 
first.”  But where subject-matter or personal jurisdiction is difficult to 
determine, and forum non conveniens considerations weigh heavily in favor of 




Thus, “there is no mandatory „sequencing of jurisdictional issues‟”, and “[a] district court . . . 
may dispose of an action by a forum non conveniens dismissal, bypassing questions of 
subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, when considerations of convenience, fairness and 
judicial economy so warrant”.108   
Notably, only non-US defendants can assert a claim of forum non conveniens; 
domestic defendants seeking similar results must make a motion to change venue under 
section 1404(a) of title 28 of the United States Code.  Sinochem therefore provides non-US 
parties with some tactical means of avoiding or minimizing jurisdictional discovery.
109
  
Although some questions still remain open – for example, whether a court that wishes to 
attach a condition to the dismissal of a case pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
can do so absent an authoritative ruling on jurisdiction
110
 – Sinochem nevertheless provides 
individual litigants with some means of avoiding burdensome jurisdictional discovery.   
As useful and welcome as Sinochem may be, it is only a limited solution available to 
foreign defendants on a case-by-case basis.  A more widely applicable method of resolving 
the issue might arise out of a different line of Supreme Court decisions regarding the pleading 
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standards necessary to overcome a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
111
  
These cases focus on the identification of the amount and type of factual matter that must be 
pled under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to withstand a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules.  On its 
face, Rule 8(a)(2) is quite straightforward, stating simply that the complaint must contain “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”.  
However, the Supreme Court recently stated in Ashcroft v Iqbal that this language results in 
the imposition of the “plausibility standard”, which indicates that: 
[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.  The plausibility standard is not akin to a 
“probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 




This line of cases does more that assert a new and arguably heightened standard for motions 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  First, the decisions openly challenge “the effectiveness 
of judicial discretion in managing litigation problems during the pre-trial phase”.113  Since 
jurisdictional discovery is a highly discretionary pre-trial device, this criticism can be 
interpreted as applying to both jurisdictional discovery as well as discovery on the merits.  
Indeed, two of the Supreme Court cases explicitly addressed the problems of pre-merits 
discovery and refused to countenance a phased system of discovery that would rely on careful 
judicial management to avoid discovery abuse.
114
  Instead, the plaintiffs were forced to 
defend the motion to dismiss on the evidence that they had in hand. 
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Second, “[t]he problem of jurisdictional discovery . . . is closely related to the 
decreased emphasis on the pleadings and the corresponding ascension of the role of pre-trial 
discovery”.115  Thus, any alteration to US pleadings standards will likely have an inverse 
effect on jurisdictional discovery.  For example, imposing heightened pleading requirements 
would appear to diminish or eliminate the need for jurisdictional discovery and could 
possibly result in a procedure that resembled service out proceedings, either with or without 
the right of cross-examination.
116
   
Third, the language of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is very 
similar to that of Rule 8(a)(1), which states that a pleading must contain “a short and plain 
statement of the grounds upon which the court‟s jurisdiction depends”.  Although Rule 
8(a)(1) has been said not to apply to facts regarding personal jurisdiction,
117
 it does appear to 
apply to other jurisdictional issues, including subject matter jurisdiction.
118
   
The Iqbal line of cases therefore suggests that the problem of jurisdictional discovery 
could be solved by extending the Supreme Court‟s newly enunciated “plausibility standard” 
to questions of jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of the dispute.
119
  Indeed, one 
federal circuit court appears to have already made a move in that direction, stating that:  
[t]he plausibility standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is, 
of course, distinct from the prima facie showing required to defeat a Rule 
12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction . . . . However, 
because our inquiries into the personal involvement necessary to pierce 
qualified immunity and establish personal jurisdiction are unavoidably 
“intertwin[ed],” . . . we now consider whether in light of the considerations set 
forth in Iqbal’s qualified immunity analysis, Arar has made a prima facie 
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Although federal courts have begun to apply Iqbal and its predecessors to pending disputes, 
the United States Congress has expressed discontent with these judicial developments and has 
moved to eliminate the advances made by the Supreme Court vis-à-vis the plausibility 
standard.
121
  However, none of these legislative efforts has yet been successful, and it is 
unlikely that such proposals will be enacted. 
The author has suggested elsewhere that the plausibility standard could usefully be 
extended to jurisdictional questions in the context of purely domestic disputes.
122
  Notably, a 
shift in that direction would benefit foreign litigants as much as it did domestic defendants, 
since US courts do not treat parties differently based on their location.  Nevertheless, it is by 
no means certain that US courts or legislators will decide to extend Iqbal to jurisdictional 
questions in the context of domestic disputes.  That conclusion need not be fatal to the 
interests of foreign litigants, however, since the United States could embrace a more limited 
type of change by adopting the plausibility standard in transnational proceedings alone.   
Such a move would not be uncontroversial.  Indeed, some commentators have argued 
against the creation of different procedural rules for cross-border litigation, claiming that 
such a regime would unfairly burden individuals and small businesses.
123
  However, there are 
at least two reasons why this sort of procedural shift may make sense in the context of the 
limited question of jurisdiction. 
First, numerous nations already distinguish between methods of asserting jurisdiction 
over domestic and international defendants, and adopting a similar approach would put the 
United States well into the mainstream of international civil procedure.  Furthermore, the 
United States could justify such a shift based on its existing jurisprudence.  For example, 
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states that use special procedures for asserting jurisdiction over foreign parties typically do so 
out of respect for the rights of foreign litigants and the interests of international comity.
124
  
Both of those concepts are already reflected in current US law.  Indeed, the US Supreme 
Court itself has stated that: 
American courts, in supervising pretrial proceedings, should exercise special 
vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the danger that unnecessary, or 
unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in a disadvantageous position. 
. . . In addition, we have long recognized the demands of comity in suits 
involving foreign states, either as parties or as sovereigns with a coordinate 
interest in the litigation.
125
   
 
Second, the international legal community – led by the American Law Institute (ALI) 
and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) – has recently 
come out in support of a bifurcated approach to civil procedure.  In 2006, the two 
organizations published the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, 
which “are intended to help reduce the impact of differences between legal systems in 
lawsuits” involving transnational commercial disputes.126  Although the Principles do not 
explicitly outline the methods by which jurisdiction may be established and thus may not 
seem entirely relevant to the current discussion,
127
 the fact that the ALI – one of the United 
States‟ leading voices in legal policymaking – has come out in favour of specialized 
procedures for transnational disputes suggests that US courts or legislators might eventually 
consider moving toward the creation of specialized transnational civil procedures, either on a 
limited or wholesale basis.   
 
E. CONCLUSION 
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It has been said that lawyers “tend to overlook their own countries‟ excesses”,128 and 
nowhere is this more true than with jurisdictional discovery.  Within the United States, the 
device is seen as part of the natural legal order – somewhat costly and time-consuming, but 
nevertheless a necessary part of the process of establishing a court‟s jurisdiction over a 
person or dispute.  It is only when the procedure is brought into the international realm that 
its truly exceptional nature becomes apparent.  Not only does the mechanism combine two of 
the most internationally criticized aspects of US civil procedure – broad discovery and an 
expansive concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction – it also requires defendants to submit to 
potentially burdensome and intrusive procedures before the court has even determined that it 
has jurisdiction.  Furthermore, foreign litigants are given no special protections in United 
States federal courts, although the recent US Supreme Court decision in Sinochem may 
provide some non-resident defendants with a limited amount of relief from jurisdictional 
discovery by allowing an alternative means (forum non conveniens) of obtaining dismissal of 
the claim. 
The future of jurisdictional discovery in transnational litigation is somewhat unclear, 
but there are possible signs of change.  For example, efforts have been made recently to bring 
issues relating to jurisdictional discovery to the attention of the United States Supreme 
Court.
129
  Even if the Supreme Court chooses not to address jurisdictional discovery directly, 
the recent decision in Iqbal provides the means for bringing the US more into line with 
international standards regarding pleadings, which could affect jurisdictional discovery as 
well.  Merits-based discovery abuse has been legislatively addressed in recent years, and it 
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may be that jurisdictional discovery will soon catch the attention of the relevant authorities.
130
  
Finally, the ALI‟s involvement in the development of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure may signal a willingness within the United States to consider 
the development of specialized procedural rules for cross-border disputes. 
Despite these intimations of change, there are no immediate proposals on the table 
that would affect the availability or scope of jurisdictional discovery in transnational 
litigation.  That is not to say that the international legal community should not keep abreast of 
the issue.  Indeed, it is vitally important that the international perspective is heard during any 
reform efforts, lest the more exceptional aspects of jurisdictional discovery be perpetuated 
simply due to a failure within the United States to understand how unusual this device is.
131
  
Furthermore, those involved in cross-border litigation have an incentive to follow US legal 
developments, given that any alteration of US domestic practices will affect transnational 
proceedings to an equal degree, at least under current law and practice. 
Although reform would be welcome in this area of law, there is much that the 
international bar can and should do even before such changes are proposed.  First and 
foremost, lawyers engaged in advising multinational actors need to educate themselves about 
jurisdictional discovery so as to better prepare their clients for the possibility – or even 
probability – that such an order may be made.  In law, the biggest danger is when “you don‟t 
know what you don‟t know”, and nowhere is that more true than with questions of procedure, 
since a single ill-advised procedural decision can have major and irrevocable repercussions. 
The second most important thing for international counsel to do follows naturally 
from the first.  Once they have information about jurisdictional discovery in transnational 
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litigation in hand, lawyers acting for non-US parties need to consider whether the strategic 
options traditionally offered to clients are indeed the best, given the easy availability of 
jurisdictional discovery.  For example, advocates typically take the view that non-appearance 
in a foreign lawsuit is a risky endeavour, only to be adopted in the most extreme 
circumstances.  Even if jurisdiction is, in a defendant‟s mind, clearly not proper, most parties 
will make a limited appearance so as to obtain a definitive ruling.  If, however, entering a 
limited appearance may and likely will subject a party to a broad order for jurisdictional 
discovery, a savvy lawyer might conclude that the risks associated with a default judgment 
are less than those associated with jurisdictional discovery.  This might be particularly true if 
the jurisdictional claims are marginal at best and jurisdictional discovery would require the 
production of sensitive or confidential information or would mirror the type of disclosures 
normally associated with discovery on the merits.  Given that parties must comply fully with 
any jurisdictional discovery orders lest sanctions be imposed (including the determination 
that jurisdiction does, in fact, exist), parties and counsel would be well advised to consider 
the issues before making a motion to contest jurisdiction.  At that point, it is too late to 




This is not to say that non-appearance is warranted in all circumstances.  Some 
litigants may believe that a limited appearance to contest jurisdiction is the preferred 
alternative because there is a strong possibility that they can prevail on a motion to dismiss 
for forum non conveniens (the Sinochem rule).  Others may be willing to take the risk of a 
limited appearance because they believe that the plaintiff will be unable to make out a case 
for jurisdictional discovery and they prefer to obtain a definitive ruling on jurisdiction.  Either 
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way, the client must make the decision in full knowledge of both the law and the facts of the 
case. 
As the above suggests, it is impossible to make blanket statements about how to 
proceed with a jurisdictional objection in the abstract, since each case will turn on its own 
individual facts.  What is likely, however, is that many parties are currently failing to 
undertake these sorts of analyses at the proper time – ie, prior to entering a limited 
appearance – because of a lack of appreciation for the role that jurisdictional discovery plays 
in US federal courts.  For years, foreign litigants have been surprised by this highly 
exceptional procedural device.  Now, however, parties and counsel can approach 
transnational litigation in US federal courts with a full understanding of the scope and 
availability of jurisdictional discovery, and the role it plays in US federal practice. 
